Article 5 of 10 — ‘The Technological Twilight of the Romanian Lands’
Previous articles: ‘The Map of Powers in 1780’, ‘The Anatomy of Tribute’, ‘Furnaces Across the Mountains’, and ‘What Did Exist in the Principalities’.
I. Nevyansk, the Winter of 1725
The leaning tower of the Demidov factory in Nevyansk, in the central Urals, rose fifty-seven metres above an artificial pond covered in ice as thick as a man’s arm. It was 27 January 1725. In St. Petersburg, three thousand kilometres away as the crow flies, Tsar Peter I of Russia had died five days earlier, at the age of fifty-two, in a modestly furnished room of the Winter Palace, tormented by a urinary infection that German doctors had been unable to stop. The news had reached Nevyansk the day before, brought by a courier who had travelled for twenty-three days with relay horses along the Moscow–Kazan–Perm–Ekaterinburg road.
Nikita Demidov, the patriarch of the family—seventy-two years old, his hands still strong, the eyes of a man who had seen it all—listened to the news in a room lit by a single whale-oil lamp. He did not speak for a long time. His son, Akinfy—forty-seven years old, more brutal than his father, more unscrupulous, but also more calculating—waited for the most important word.
‘What do we do with the Admiralty order?’ he finally asked.
Nikita remained silent a while longer. The order was for two hundred tonnes of rolled iron, which were to be dispatched in the spring by sledge convoy to Nizhny Novgorod, then by barge down the Volga to Astrakhan, and from there by ship to St. Petersburg. From there, it would be shipped on merchant vessels to Amsterdam, where the Dutch Admiralty needed good iron for brigs and frigates. The contract had been signed directly with the late Tsar two years earlier. Half the sum had been paid in advance—funds that had arrived in Nevyansk in sealed sacks, escorted by Cossacks.
‘We send it,’ Nikita said at last. ‘Contracts do not die with men. Contracts die with money.’
Beneath the leaning tower of the factory, in a cellar that would give rise to a legend—it is said that Demidov later drowned falsified accounting ledgers there, and, according to some versions, even a few silent servants who knew too much—the iron furnaces operated at temperatures that Râmnic, Bucharest, and Iași could not have imagined. Through the windows, the snow glittered, and beneath the snow, the ceaseless movement of people continued. Six thousand souls, the entire factory settlement. A hell of iron and ice. And beneath the ice, hundreds of millions of puds of ore that, in the coming decades, would flow to Amsterdam and London.
By 1780—fifty-five years after that January day—peasant Russia, seemingly backward, was exporting more iron to European markets than James Watt’s England.
How? By what mechanism? At what human cost? And, for the Romanian reader: why could serfdom-ridden Russia, with a system far more brutal than that of Moldavia and Wallachia, achieve what the Principalities could not?
This is the subject of the present article. A comparative exercise that does not defend Tsarist Russia—on the contrary, it exposes its brutality—but which forces us to understand that the absence of industrialisation in our lands cannot be explained by ‘human underdevelopment.’ It is explained by geopolitics, by imperial scale, by coherent political will, and by the brutal willingness to use people as a resource convertible into tonnes of iron.





